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THE QUEST FOR CONGRUENCE:
WHY THE RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED
PERSONS ACT SHOULD APPLY TO EMINENT DOMAIN
Vikki Bollettino∗
I.

INTRODUCTION

Eminent domain and zoning authority are two important tools
municipalities and states employ to control land use within their borders. When a state or municipality’s right to control land use intersects with an individual’s right to use his property as he sees fit, it is
not uncommon for tensions to rise. For example, in Kelo v. City of
1
New London the Supreme Court of the United States held that an
economic development plan constituted a public use under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitu2
tion, thereby making it easier for municipalities to take property that
is not generating tax revenue and local spending. State legislatures
reacted to Kelo with a firestorm of legislation aimed at limiting local
3
eminent domain powers.
The issue of land use control through zoning and eminent domain becomes even more heated when state authority conflicts with
an individual’s First Amendment right to freely exercise his religious
4
beliefs, as protected by the Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause.
Seeking to balance the state’s right to control land use with the individual’s free exercise right, Congress passed the Religious Land Use
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1
545 U.S. 469 (2005).
2
Id. at 483–89.
3
Patricia H. Lee, Eminent Domain: In the Aftermath of Kelo v. New London, a Resurrection in Norwood: One Public Interest Attorney’s View, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 121,
134 (2006) (noting that “[i]mmediately following the United States Supreme Court’s
2005 Kelo decision, ‘legislatures in 28 states have introduced more than 70 bills
aimed at curbing local eminent domain powers’”).
4
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free
exercise [of religion] . . . .”).
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and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) in 2000. RLUIPA provides that government regulations that substantially burden the free
exercise of religion may be imposed only to further a compelling
government interest and must be narrowly tailored to achieve that in6
7
terest. This standard is also known as the strict scrutiny test. Adopting the individualized assessment distinction set forth in Employment
8
Division v. Smith, RLUIPA mandates strict scrutiny review of individu9
alized applications of regulatory land use laws. Surprisingly, RLUIPA
is written to apply only to zoning and landmarking laws that substantially burden religious exercise. However, religious institutions are
particularly vulnerable to takings in the post-Kelo environment, and
several facing condemnation have used RLUIPA to challenge the ex10
ercise of eminent domain authority as well. Whether land use regulation burdens free exercise through the application of a zoning law
or through the exercise of eminent domain, both land use tools require an individualized assessment of their impact on the target
property, and therefore under Smith both require a strict scrutiny
11
analysis if their application burdens the free exercise of religion.
Applying RLUIPA to zoning and landmarking laws but not to exercises of eminent domain risks inconsistency and divergent case law.
Alternatively, applying RLUIPA to both zoning laws and takings
would develop precedent and consistency within the category of land
use control of religious property.
This Comment argues that eminent domain, like zoning, should
be subject to strict scrutiny review under RLUIPA. Part II discusses a
12
pending case, Albanian Associated Fund v. Township of Wayne, to illu5

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2006). RLUIPA was Congress’s second attempt to provide protection for free exercise following the invalidation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 in City of Boerne v. Flores. Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.)
1488, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)).
6
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1).
7
See, e.g., Tenafly Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 165 n.24 (3d
Cir. 2002) (stating that in order to meet the strict scrutiny standard, a law must be
“narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government interest”).
8
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
9
See infra Part VII. Smith provides that where a generally applicable law has the
incidental effect of burdening the free exercise of religion, the Free Exercise Clause
is not frustrated. Smith, 494 U.S. at 893 (O’Connor, J., concurring). However, if the
individualized application of a state law burdens free exercise, that law must pass
strict scrutiny review. Id. at 894.
10
See infra Part IV.
11
Smith, 494 U.S. at 878 (majority opinion).
12
No. 06-3217 (D.N.J. filed July 17, 2006).
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strate how eminent domain may hamper free exercise. Part III outlines the history and discusses the relevant provisions of RLUIPA.
Part IV describes the current debate over whether RLUIPA should
apply to eminent domain actions through a discussion of current case
law. Part V argues that eminent domain may be exercised in a manner that is analogous to the application of a zoning law, and therefore
should be similarly subject to strict scrutiny review when it burdens
free exercise. Part VI illustrates how zoning and eminent domain are
used together to achieve the broader purpose of land use regulation,
and thus both should be reviewed using a strict scrutiny analysis. Part
VII discusses the need for strict scrutiny review of eminent domain
condemnations of religious property post-Kelo. Ultimately, this
Comment argues that since government frequently exercises both its
zoning and eminent domain authority for the broader purpose of
land use regulation, eminent domain challenges, like zoning challenges, should receive strict scrutiny review under RLUIPA.
II. EMINENT DOMAIN AND RLUIPA:
AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE PROBLEM
On July 17, 2006, the Albanian Associated Fund (AAF) filed a
complaint against the Township of Wayne (“township”) alleging that
the township improperly delayed the AAF’s land development application to build a mosque on AAF property, despite the fact that reli13
gious worship was a permitted use within that zone. The AAF, a religious non-profit organization, was created for the purpose of
establishing a mosque to provide a public place of worship for the
14
Albanian Muslim community in northeastern New Jersey.
The
community, which numbered approximately two hundred at the time
the complaint was filed, had been using a facility that was inadequate
15
in terms of size and location. To meet the needs of its congrega16
tion, the AAF purchased the disputed property in October 2001.
On October 17, 2002, the AAF submitted a land development application to the township stating its intention to develop the property as
17
a religious facility. In an attempt to address the township’s concerns
regarding a potential increase in automobile traffic and damage to
13

Complaint at 2, Albanian Associated Fund v. Twp. of Wayne, No. 06-3217
(D.N.J. filed July 17, 2006).
14
Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction at 5, Albanian
Associated Fund v. Twp. of Wayne, No. 6-3217 (D.N.J. filed July 17, 2006).
15
Id.
16
Complaint, supra note 13, at 22.
17
Id. at 29.
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the environment, the AAF revised its site plan three times and appeared before the township planning board over twenty times from
18
February 2003 through May 2006. Finally, on April 5, 2006, the
township passed a resolution in furtherance of its “Open Space and
Recreation Plan” that sought to condemn the AAF’s property, thus
19
putting an end to the AAF’s development application. The township further stated that the mosque property “was identified . . . for
20
preservation.”
The AAF challenged the condemnation as a violation of the Free
21
Exercise Clause of both the United States Constitution and the New
22
Jersey Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause of both the United
23
24
States Constitution and the New Jersey Constitution, the “public
use” requirement of the Takings Clause of the United States Consti25
26
tution, and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. Further,
the AAF argued that the condemnation imposed a substantial burden
27
on the AAF’s free exercise of religion in violation of RLUIPA. The
township’s motion for summary judgment was denied on October 1,
28
2007.
29
Albanian Associated Fund v. Township of Wayne illustrates the targeted land use regulation Congress sought to address with RLUIPA.
RLUIPA codified the individualized assessment exception to Employ30
ment Division v. Smith. In Smith, the Supreme Court held that if a
state has a system under which it may grant individualized exemptions from a generally applicable law, the state cannot decline to
grant such an exemption without a compelling purpose in a situation
18

Id. at 39–43.
Id. at 55–60.
20
Id. at 60.
21
Id. at 75.
22
Complaint, supra note 13, at 76.
23
Id. at 81.
24
Id. at 83.
25
Id. at 85.
26
Id. at 87.
27
Id. at 77–79.
28
See Albanian Associated Fund v. Twp. of Wayne, No. 06-3217, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 73176, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 1, 2007) (order denying motion for summary judgment). The U.S. Department of Justice intervened on behalf of the AAF and filed an
amicus brief on July 19, 2007. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Albanian Associated Fund v.
Twp. of Wayne, No. 06-3217 (D.N.J. filed July 19, 2007), available at
http://www.becketfund.org/files/c1aad.pdf.
29
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73176 (D.N.J. Oct. 1, 2007).
30
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C) (2006).
19
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where the law burdens the free exercise of religion. As Albanian Associated Fund demonstrates, eminent domain may be used in an individualized manner; the township specifically identified the AAF
32
property as one for preservation under its plan. Because an individualized exercise of land use regulatory tools would be subject to
strict scrutiny under Smith, the strict scrutiny standard should apply to
any individualized land use control that burdens the free exercise of
religion, whether it be achieved through zoning or eminent domain.
As this Comment will discuss, the exercise of eminent domain
may require an individualized assessment of the taking, for example,
through public hearings where the municipality or state evaluates the
33
effect of the taking on a particular property. Further, eminent domain and zoning are commonly used in conjunction for land use
34
regulation. Because eminent domain and zoning are two land use
controls that are frequently used together to effect regulatory
schemes, it is incongruous to apply strict scrutiny to one and not the
other. RLUIPA was meant to be a comprehensive act addressing
what Congress found to be the frequent burdening of free exercise
35
within the land use context. Applying strict scrutiny to one regulatory tool, zoning, and not to another, eminent domain, would lead to
divergent case law, which would be an illogical result considering the
frequency with which these two regulatory tools are used together
36
and the similarities in their application.
III. BACKGROUND
In 2000 Congress passed RLUIPA in an effort to address what it
determined to be a frequent burdening of free exercise rights in the
37
land use and institutional context. The path leading to RLUIPA’s
passage began with the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Em38
ployment Division v. Smith. Prior to Smith, the strict scrutiny standard
31
32
33
34
35

Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990).
Complaint, supra note 13, at 60.
See infra Part V.D.
See infra Part VI.
146 CONG. REC. 16,698–99 (2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kenne-

dy).
36

See infra Parts V, VI.
146 CONG. REC. 16,698 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy). In the institutionalized persons context, RLUIPA requires a strict scrutiny analysis of government action that substantially burdens the religious exercise of “a person
residing in or confined to an institution.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). This Comment
addresses RLUIPA in the land use context only.
38
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
37
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39

was applied to all free exercise challenges. Smith signaled a remark40
able shift from this standard.
In Smith the Court moved from its previous strict scrutiny examination of regulations that burdened the free exercise of religion
and held that where a generally applicable law had the incidental effect of burdening free exercise, the Court would apply rational basis
41
review. The respondents in Smith challenged an Oregon criminal
statute that prohibited the possession of controlled substances, in42
cluding peyote. The respondents were dismissed from employment
43
because they had ingested peyote. The Employment Division denied respondents’ petition for unemployment benefits because res44
pondents had been dismissed for “misconduct.” The respondents
argued that the Oregon criminal statute hampered the free exercise
of their religion because they had ingested the peyote as a sacrament
at a ceremony of the Native American Church to which they be45
longed. The issue before the Court was whether the Oregon statute,
which did not contain an exception for the sacramental use of controlled substances, impermissibly burdened the free exercise of reli46
gion in violation of the First Amendment. The Court upheld the
Oregon law, stating that if hampering free exercise was “merely the
incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provi47
sion, the First Amendment has not been offended.” However, the
Court clarified that where the state had a system for granting exemptions from a generally applicable law on an individualized basis, the
state could not decline such an exemption in cases where the law
48
burdened religion without a compelling purpose.
Congress reacted to Smith by enacting the Religious Freedom
and Restoration Act (RFRA), which mandated strict scrutiny review of
laws that substantially burden religious exercise, regardless of the
39

See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (stating that “only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate
claims to the free exercise of religion”); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963)
(holding that if state legislation had the incidental effect of burdening the free exercise of religion, it could be justified only by a compelling state interest).
40
Smith, 494 U.S. at 891 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the Court’s
holding “dramatically departs from well-settled First Amendment jurisprudence”).
41
Id. at 878 (majority opinion).
42
Id. at 875.
43
Id. at 874.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
47
Id. at 878.
48
Id. at 884.
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49

type of law. Specifically, RFRA’s purpose was to “restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially
50
burdened.” However, Congress’s attempt to restore strict scrutiny
was short-lived; four years after its passage, the Supreme Court in City
of Boerne v. Flores held that RFRA was unconstitutional as an impermissible exercise of Congress’s remedial powers under the Four51
teenth Amendment.
In City of Boerne v. Flores the Supreme Court found that in passing
RFRA Congress had overstepped its authority under the Enforcement
Clause, which provides Congress with the power to remedy violations
of the Fourteenth Amendment, but does not permit Congress to de52
fine the substance of Fourteenth Amendment rights. Further, when
Congress exercises its remedial powers, its response to a violation
53
must be both proportional and congruent. The Court held that
RFRA was neither a proportional nor congruent response to a constitutional violation, but instead was a substantive change in constitu54
tional law. Because RFRA applied at the local, state, and federal levels, the Court found that its broad coverage “ensures its intrusion at
55
every level of government.” Ultimately, the Court held RFRA unconstitutional because it was “broader than is appropriate if the goal
56
is to prevent and remedy constitutional violations.” Today, RFRA is
57
valid only as applied to federal government action.
A. The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
58

Congress passed RLUIPA in 2000. RLUIPA reinstates the strict
59
scrutiny standard of RFRA but in a more limited manner. RLUIPA
mandates strict scrutiny review of government action that substantial49

Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1488, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)).
50
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2006).
51
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
52
Id. at 519−20.
53
Id. at 532.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 535.
57
See, e.g., O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d
973, 976 (10th Cir. 2004).
58
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2006).
59
146 CONG. REC. 16,698 (2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy).
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60

ly burdens the exercise of religion. RLUIPA applies this analysis to
land use regulations and government actions affecting people in state
61
institutions, such as state penitentiaries. Thus, Congress sought to
restore the strict scrutiny standard of RFRA, but in a more limited
manner so as to avoid colliding with the same constitutional issues
62
that caused RFRA’s demise. The congressional hearing record demonstrates that the Free Exercise Clause was frequently violated in a
land use context, and RLUIPA was specifically meant to address this
63
issue. Under RLUIPA:
No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation
in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious
exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution,
unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person, assembly, or institution—
(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
64
governmental interest.

Within the land use context, RLUIPA applies where:
(A) the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity
that receives Federal financial assistance, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability;
(B) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial
burden would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the
several States, or with Indian tribes, even if the burden results
from a rule of general applicability; or
(C) the substantial burden is imposed in the implementation of a
land use regulation or system of land use regulations, under
which a government makes, or has in place formal or informal
procedures or practices that permit the government to make, individualized assessments of the proposed uses for the property in65
volved.

Lastly, under RLUIPA a land use regulation is defined as a “zoning or
landmarking law, or the application of such a law, that limits or restricts
66
a claimant’s use or development of land.” In terms of its application, RLUIPA should be “construed in favor of a broad protection of
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1)(A)–(B).
Id. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5.
146 CONG. REC. 16,698 (2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy).
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1).
Id. § 2000cc(a)(2)(A)–(C).
Id. § 2000cc-5(5) (emphasis added).
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religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of
67
this chapter and the Constitution.” When bringing a claim under
RLUIPA, the claimant must first establish that the government action
68
substantially burdens the free exercise of his religion. Once a claimant has sufficiently demonstrated a substantial burden, the government has the burden of proving that its action is the least restric69
tive means of advancing a compelling government interest.
B. Variations on the Definition of “Substantial Burden”
Courts have attempted to define “substantial burden” in various
70
ways. In Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit established a strict
standard for what type of regulation would constitute a substantial
burden. The appellants, an association of Chicago-area churches,
claimed that both the lack of affordable housing and the costs of
complying with the procedural requirements for obtaining a special
use permit together imposed a substantial burden on the free exer71
cise of their religion. The court found that the steps an applicant
would need to take to comply with the Chicago zoning ordinance did
72
not amount to a substantial burden upon religion. In defining substantial burden, the court stated that the burden would be one that
“necessarily bears direct, primary, and fundamental responsibility for
73
rendering religious exercise . . . effectively impracticable.” Because
appellants had failed to make a prima facie showing of this type of
burden, they failed to establish that government action substantially
74
burdened religion as required to bring a claim under RLUIPA.
Not all courts have been so demanding. In Guru Nanak Sikh So75
ciety v. County of Sutter, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California criticized the “extremely high threshold” the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit set for bring76
ing a claim under RLUIPA. In Guru Nanak, the plaintiff applied for
a conditional use permit in order to build a Sikh temple within a res67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Id. § 2000cc-3(g).
Id. § 2000cc-2(b).
Id.
342 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 761.
Id. at 762.
Id. at 761.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–2(b).
326 F. Supp. 2d 1140 (E.D. Cal. 2003).
Id. at 1153.

BOLLETTINO

1272

(Final Edit)

1/13/2010 5:17 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1263

idential zone where churches and temples were conditionally permit77
ted. Churches and temples were not a permitted use in any of the
districts within Sutter County, but instead were allowed within six dis78
tricts only if accompanied by a conditional use permit. The Sutter
County Board denied the plaintiff’s application, effectively shutting
79
his temple out of the entire county. The plaintiff claimed that both
Sutter County’s land use scheme and the board’s denial of his conditional use permit violated the Free Exercise Clause and the Equal
80
Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution, as well as RLUIPA.
The court began its analysis by finding that the plaintiff’s desire
to build a religious temple was “religious exercise” as defined by
RLUIPA, stating that the “requirement that there be a facility for religious assembly is common and fundamental to many of the world’s
81
religions.” In addressing whether the denial and land use scheme
constituted a substantial burden, the court rejected the Seventh Circuit test articulated in Civil Liberties and instead defined a substantial
burden as “one which actually inhibits religious practice by virtue of a
82
land use decision.” Because the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of substantial burden, and because the county failed to counteract that claim with a compelling government interest, the court
83
found that the denial of the permit was a violation of RLUIPA.
Thus, in order to bring a claim under RLUIPA, the claimant, at a
minimum, must be able to establish that the land use regulation has
the effect of inhibiting the free exercise of religion.
C. Defining “Compelling Government Interest”
Under RLUIPA, if a government-imposed land use regulation
inflicts a substantial burden on free exercise, a strict scrutiny analysis
is applied and the government must show that the burden is imposed
in furtherance of a compelling government interest and that the land
use restriction is the least restrictive means of furthering that inter84
est. RLUIPA itself does not define what qualifies as a compelling
government interest. However, the legislative history reveals that

77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84

Id. at 1142.
Id. at 1146.
Id. at 1145–46.
Id. at 1146.
Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 1146.
Id. at 1154.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2006).
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“[t]he phrase . . . is taken directly from RFRA . . . and is intended to
85
codify the traditional compelling interest test.”
The Supreme Court has articulated several definitions of what
constitutes a compelling government interest. For example, in Sher86
bert v. Verner, South Carolina defended the denial of unemployment
benefits for the plaintiff under the South Carolina Unemployment
Compensation Act as being necessary to avoid fraudulent claims
87
which would diminish the unemployment compensation fund.
However, the Supreme Court found that the state’s interest in pre88
venting fraud did not constitute a compelling government interest.
Instead, the Court held that “[o]nly the gravest abuses endangering
89
paramount interests give occasion for permissible limitation.”
90
Similarly, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court found that
the state’s interest in education was not a compelling government interest worthy of permissible infringement on the respondents’ free
91
exercise rights. In Yoder, the respondents, members of the Conservative Mennonite Church, were charged with violating Wisconsin’s
compulsory school attendance law, which required attendance by
92
members until the age of sixteen.
The respondents refused to
comply with the law on the grounds that high school education was
93
contrary to the Amish religion. The Court found that the state’s interest in high school attendance was not of adequate significance to
justify infringing upon the respondents’ right to free exercise of reli94
gion. In so holding, the Court stated that “[o]nly those interests of
the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance le95
gitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”
Although compelling government interest is not defined in
RLUIPA, several courts addressing the issue have determined what
does not qualify as a compelling interest. For example, in Mintz v.
85

146 CONG. REC. 19,123 (2000) (statement of Rep. Canady).
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
87
Id. at 407.
88
Id. at 408–09.
89
Id. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
90
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
91
Id. at 234–35.
92
Id. at 207.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 234–35.
95
Id. at 215; see also Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 546 (1993) (stating that “[a] law of restrictive religious practice must advance
‘interests of the highest order’ and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests”).
86
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96

Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield, the United States District Court
for the District of Massachusetts concluded that maintaining the setback and coverage requirements listed in the town’s zoning bylaw was
97
not a compelling interest. The diocese owned property in Lenox,
Massachusetts, which housed both a church (“St. Ann’s”) and a rec98
tory. St. Ann’s sought to construct a parish center whose building
plans did not meet the coverage and setback requirements of the by99
law. After St. Ann’s applied for a building permit, the Lenox Special
Town Counsel issued an opinion stating its belief that the section of
the bylaw at issue violated RLUIPA, leading the Zoning Board of Ap100
peals (ZBA) to grant the permit. The plaintiffs, who owned property surrounding St. Ann’s, sued both the diocese and the ZBA seeking
101
a revocation of the permit. The district court agreed with the ZBA
and held that “setback and coverage requirements reveal no particu102
larly compelling interest.” Further, discussing the other possible interests of limited parking and congestion, the court found that
“[p]rior to RLUIPA . . . such concerns were not universally consi103
dered compelling.”
The court ultimately found the setback and
104
coverage requirements violated RLUIPA.
105
In Elsinore Christian Center v. City of Lake Elsinore, the United
States District Court for the Central District of California held that
the city’s interest in generating tax revenue did not represent a compelling government interest, but suggested that the desire to combat
106
urban blight may qualify as a compelling interest.
Faced with inadequate parking, the Elsinore Christian Center (“Church”) purchased property in an economically depressed area of downtown
107
Lake Elsinore. Churches were permitted in the location subject to
the grant of a conditional use permit (“CUP”), which the city’s planning commission declined to issue based on factors including the

96

424 F. Supp. 2d 309 (D. Mass. 2006).
Id. at 323.
98
Id. at 311.
99
Id. at 312–13.
100
Id. at 313.
101
Id. at 310.
102
Mintz, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 323.
103
Id. at 324 (citing Love Church v. City of Evanston, 671 F. Supp. 515, 519 (N.D.
Ill. 1987)).
104
Id. at 328.
105
291 F. Supp. 2d 1083 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
106
Id. at 1093.
107
Id. at 1086.
97
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prevention of a loss of property tax revenue. The Church sued, alleging that the zoning ordinance and denial of the CUP violated
109
RLUIPA.
Rejecting the city’s tax revenue justifications, the court
held that “maintenance of property tax revenue is a potentially pretextual basis for decision-making that [was] a specific target of
110
RLUIPA.” Addressing the city’s interest in combating urban blight,
the court stated that the interest in preserving the quality of urban
111
life was of “[p]aramount importance in land use planning.” However, the court stopped short of defining the interest in curbing
blight as compelling because it found that the city’s denial of the
CUP was not taken in furtherance of that interest as required by
112
RLUIPA.
At least one court has defined a city’s interest in maintaining its
113
zoning regulations as compelling. In Konikov v. Orange County, the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida held
that even if the plaintiff had been capable of demonstrating a substantial burden on his right to free exercise, the county had established that it had a compelling interest in enforcing its zoning
114
scheme, and it had done so in the least restrictive manner possible.
The plaintiff in Konikov was a rabbi who began conducting religious
115
services on the property he owned in a residential neighborhood.
Surrounding property owners notified the Orange County Code Enforcement Division, which issued a code violation notice and gave the
116
plaintiff seven days to come into compliance with the code.
Approximately one month later a hearing was held before the Code En117
forcement Board. The hearing included witness testimony and the
introduction of evidence gathered from an eight-month investiga118
tion. At the hearing’s conclusion, the Board required the plaintiff
to obtain special exception approval if he wished to continue offering
119
the religious services. The plaintiff declined and instead filed suit,
arguing that the county’s land use code violated both the United
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119

Id.
Id. at 1087.
Id. at 1093.
Elsinore, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 1094.
Id.
302 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (M.D. Fla. 2003).
Id. at 1343.
Id. at 1331.
Id. at 1332.
Id. at 1333.
Id.
Konikov, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 1336.
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120

States and Florida Constitutions and RLUIPA.
The court found
that the county’s actions survived the application of the strict scrutiny
standard, stating that a “[g]overnment’s interest in zoning is indeed
121
compelling.” Ultimately, the court found that the county’s zoning
122
code did not violate either the Free Exercise Clause or RLUIPA.
Because there is no consensus, it is difficult to predict whether a
court faced with an RLUIPA claim would find that the city or county’s
interest in enforcing its zoning code constitutes a compelling gov123
ernment interest, as required under strict scrutiny review. It is clear
that when challenging a land use regulation under RLUIPA, the
claimant must first establish that the regulation imposes a substantial
burden on the free exercise of religion before the regulation must be
124
justified by a compelling government interest.
That compelling
government interest must be something akin to those articulated in
125
Sherbert and Yoder.
IV. CURRENT SPLIT OVER WHETHER RLUIPA APPLIES
TO EXERCISES OF EMINENT DOMAIN
As Part IV of this Comment will illustrate, because the public
hearing element that accompanies an eminent domain condemnation is analogous to the individualized assessment that occurs in the
granting or denial of a zoning variance, strict scrutiny is the appro120

Id.
Id. at 1343; see also First Baptist Church of Perrine v. Miami-Dade County, 768
So. 2d 1114, 1118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the county “clearly has a
compelling interest in enacting and enforcing fair and reasonable zoning regulations”).
122
Konikov, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 1343, 1345.
123
Id. at 1333.
124
See Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y v. County of Sutter, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1154
(E.D. Cal. 2003).
125
146 CONG. REC. 19,123 (2000) (statement of Rep. Canady). RLUIPA has been
challenged as an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s Section V remedial authority. However, as the hearing records for both RFRA and RLUIPA suggest, Congress
felt a strict scrutiny standard was necessary to protect the right to the free exercise of
religion from unnecessary governmental intrusion. 146 CONG. REC. 16,698 (2000)
(joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy); 138 CONG. REC. 18,016–17 (1992)
(statement of Sen. Kennedy). Specifically, Congress found that there was “massive
evidence” in RLUIPA’s hearing record that discrimination in the land use context
was widespread. 146 CONG. REC. 16,698 (2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and
Kennedy). Further, when rejecting a challenge to RLUIPA’s constitutionality in Lighthouse Community Church of God v. City of Southfield, the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan stated that it aligned itself with “all circuit courts, and
almost all district courts . . . [which] have found RLUIPA is a constitutional use of
congressional power under Section V . . . .” Lighthouse Cmty. Church of God v. City
of Southfield, No. 05-40220, 2007 WL 30280, at *10 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 3, 2007).
121
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priate analysis for both land use regulatory tools. Under current Supreme Court jurisprudence that stems from Employment Division v.
126
127
Smith and Sherbert v. Verner, where the government has in place a
system of individualized assessment, the denial of an exemption in
situations where free exercise is burdened must be justified by a
compelling government purpose. RLUIPA sought to codify the indi128
vidualized assessment exception to Smith. Because eminent domain
can be exercised in an individualized manner, strict scrutiny should
apply where its use burdens the free exercise of religion.
District Courts are divided over whether the strict scrutiny standard applied to zoning provisions challenged under RLUIPA should
be applied to eminent domain condemnations as well. Thus far, only
the United States District Court for the Central District of California
has applied a strict scrutiny analysis to an eminent domain condem129
nation. However, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois left open the possibility that there may be situations
where eminent domain, specifically when used in conjunction with
130
zoning regulations, should also receive a strict scrutiny analysis. Because eminent domain and zoning provisions are frequently used together to effectuate a broader regulatory land use plan, it would be
incongruous to apply a strict scrutiny analysis to one and not the other.
A. Cottonwood Christian Center v. Cypress Redevelopment
131
Agency
In Cottonwood Christian Center v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, the
United States District Court for the Central District of California used
126
127
128

494 U.S. 872 (1990).
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
See 146 CONG. REC. 16,699 (2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kenne-

dy):
The General Rules in s2(a)(1), requiring that substantial burdens on
religious exercise be justified by a compelling interest, applies only to
cases within the spending power or the commerce power, or to cases
where government has authority to make individualized assessments of
the proposed uses to which the property will be put. Where government makes such individualized assessments, permitting some uses and
excluding others, it cannot exclude religious uses without compelling
justification.
129
Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d
1203, 1222 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
130
St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 401 F. Supp. 2d 887, 900
(N.D. Ill. 2005).
131
218 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
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strict scrutiny to analyze the denial of the plaintiff’s CUP and the
city’s subsequent exercise of eminent domain to the plaintiff’s prop132
erty.
In 1990, the City of Cypress adopted a redevelopment plan
and classified several parcels within the area to be redeveloped—
133
including the parcel the plaintiff would later purchase—as blighted.
Cottonwood Christian Center (“Cottonwood”) had outgrown its site
of worship and purchased two parcels within the redevelopment area
134
in September 1999. On October 6, 2000, Cottonwood submitted an
135
application for a CUP. On October 26, the City Planning Manager
notified Cottonwood that its application was incomplete because it
136
lacked design review studies.
Four days later, the city council imposed a moratorium on CUPs while it examined possibilities for re137
development of the area. By 2001, the city had neared completion
of its plans for redevelopment of the area, which included the addi138
tion of a large Costco store. In February 2002, the Cypress Center
Redevelopment Agency made an offer to purchase the Cottonwood
139
property, which was refused. In May 2002, the city filed an action to
140
Cottonwood filed suit claiming that the concondemn the land.
141
demnation violated RLUIPA.
In analyzing Cottonwood’s claims, the court found that strict
142
scrutiny should apply for several reasons. First, the court found that
Cottonwood’s plan to build a church on its new property and subsequent church activities would have a significant impact on interstate
143
144
commerce, thus bringing the claim within RLUIPA’s jurisdiction.
Second, the court found that the city’s denial of Cottonwood’s CUP
145
qualified as a land use regulation under the RLUIPA. Most notably,
the court stated that “[e]ven if the Court were only considering the
condemnation proceedings, they would fall under RLUIPA’s definition of ‘land use regulation’ . . . . The Redevelopment Agency’s au132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145

Id. at 1219–20.
Id. at 1211.
Id. at 1213.
Id.
Id.
Cottonwood, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1213.
Id. at 1214.
Id.
Id. at 1214–15.
Id. at 1218.
Id. at 1221–24.
Cottonwood, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1221–22.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(B) (2006).
Cottonwood, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1222.
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thority to exercise eminent domain . . . is based on a zoning system
146
developed by the City.” The court interpreted RLUIPA’s statutory
language, which defines land use regulation as a “zoning or land147
marking law, or the application of such a law,” to apply to the city’s use
of eminent domain as based on the zoning system set forth in the re148
development plan.
Because the city was using eminent domain as
an instrument to enact a broader land use regulatory plan, the court
found that the city’s exercise of eminent domain should likewise be
149
subject to a strict scrutiny analysis. The court held that the city’s interests in generating revenue and combating blight failed to meet the
compelling interest standard required where strict scrutiny is applied
150
to government action that burdens the free exercise of religion.
Finally, the court found the city had failed to demonstrate that there
was no other way to generate revenue without taking the church
151
property.
B. Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton

152

Unlike the Cottonwood court, in Faith Temple Church v. Town of
Brighton, the United States District Court for the Western District of
New York found RLUIPA did not apply to eminent domain condem153
nations.
In 2004, the Faith Temple congregation had grown too
154
large for its site of worship and purchased a larger parcel of land.
However, unbeknownst to Faith Temple, in a 2000 update of its comprehensive plan, the Town of Brighton had recommended annexing
155
that same parcel to facilitate the expansion of an adjacent park. In
156
2004, the town initiated condemnation of the Faith Temple parcel.
Addressing Faith Temple’s RLUIPA claim, the court found that
RLUIPA did not apply because eminent domain is not a “zoning law”
157
as defined under the RLUIPA. Faith Temple argued that the condemnation was tied to the comprehensive plan and therefore

146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157

Id. at 1222 n.9.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5) (emphasis added).
Cottonwood, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1222 n.9.
Id.
Id. at 1228.
Id. at 1228–29.
405 F. Supp. 2d 250 (W.D.N.Y. 2005).
Id. at 255.
Id. at 251.
Id.
Id. at 251–52.
Id. at 254.
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158

amounted to the application of a zoning law.
However, the court
rejected this argument because, unlike the Cottonwood court, it found
the relationship between eminent domain and zoning too atte159
nuated.
160

C. City & County of Honolulu v. Sherman and St. John’s
161
United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago
In City & County of Honolulu v. Sherman and St. John’s United
Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, both the Supreme Court of Hawaii
and the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, respectively, left open the possibility that where eminent domain is used with other land use regulatory tools that require individualized assessments, strict scrutiny review of condemnations of
162
religious property may be appropriate.
In Sherman, the Supreme
Court of Hawaii held that the Revised Ordinances of Honolulu
(ROH) challenged by the First United Methodist Church did not
amount to a zoning or landmarking law, and therefore, the court
163
found RLUIPA inapplicable. The ROH authorized the City of Honolulu to obtain a fee simple interest in the land located underneath
condominium developments from current landowners in order to
164
convey fee simple title to the leasing occupants of the units.
The
First United Methodist Church owned several units within a condo165
minium building on the island.
The church challenged the con166
The Supreme Court of
demnation, claiming it violated RLUIPA.
Hawaii held that the ROH could not be classified as either a land167
marking or zoning law, and, therefore, RLUIPA did not apply.
However, the court also stated that the “condemnation right, stand168
This statement leaves open the
ing alone, is not a ‘zoning law.’”

158

Faith Temple, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 256.
Id. at 257.
160
129 P.3d 542 (Haw. 2006).
161
401 F. Supp. 2d 887 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
162
Id. (holding that although strict scrutiny was not required where the city of
Chicago condemned a religiously affiliated cemetery, not all condemnations were by
definition outside of RLUIPA’s strict scrutiny mandate); Sherman, 129 P.3d at 564
(holding that when the condemnation right is exercised alone without other regulatory land use controls, strict scrutiny is not required under RLUIPA).
163
Sherman, 129 P.3d at 564.
164
Id. at 545 n.1.
165
Id. at 546.
166
Id.
167
Id. at 564.
168
Id.
159
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possibility that when an eminent domain condemnation is not “standing alone,” but instead is used in conjunction with other land use
regulatory tools, strict scrutiny may be appropriate.
In St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois analyzed a
claim that the expansion of Chicago’s O’Hare Airport onto church
169
property violated RLUIPA.
In 2002, Chicago commenced its plan
to build new runways as part of an expansion of the O’Hare Interna170
tional Airport. The construction required the city to acquire sever171
al parcels of land, including a cemetery affiliated with St. John’s.
The affected plaintiffs, including St. John’s, succeeded in enjoining
172
the condemnation in 2002. In response to a request from the City
of Chicago, the Illinois General Assembly passed the O’Hare Moder173
nization Act (OMA), which amended the Illinois Religious Free174
dom Restoration Act (IRFRA) to specifically state that IRFRA did
not limit the authority of Chicago to use its powers under the OMA to
175
relocate cemeteries. St. John’s responded to the OMA by filing suit
in 2003 under both the United States Constitution and RLUIPA,
claiming the condemnation would substantially burden its religious
176
beliefs.
The court determined that the city’s exercise of eminent domain
did not stem from a zoning regulation or landmarking law and thus
177
was not governed by RLUIPA. St. John’s argued that, according to
Cottonwood, all exercises of eminent domain are governed by
178
RLUIPA. The court instead interpreted Cottonwood as standing for
the proposition that, where eminent domain is used in conjunction
179
with zoning regulations, RLUIPA would be applicable.
St. John’s
argued that Chicago’s condemnation of the cemetery was related to
land use regulation because the condemnation would impose a re180
striction on St. John’s use of the property. The court rejected this
169

401 F. Supp. 2d 887, 891–92 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
Id. at 890.
171
Id.
172
Id. at 891.
173
O’Hare Modernization Act, 620 ILL. COMP. STAT. 65/5 (2003).
174
Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/1-99
(1998).
175
775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/30 (1998).
176
St. John’s United Church of Christ, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 891–92.
177
Id. at 899.
178
Id. at 899–900.
179
Id. at 900.
180
Id.
170
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argument and stated that, in condemning the property, Chicago was
not acting pursuant to a zoning or landmarking law, but that the
court’s decision “should not be taken to mean that all condemnation
181
proceedings necessarily are outside the scope of RLUIPA.”
The
court went on to hypothesize that “an act to acquire land (through
eminent domain) and then to rezone it and transfer it might very
182
well fall with [sic] the reach of RLUIPA.”
As Part V of this Comment illustrates, eminent domain and zoning are often used in this
183
manner to implement a broader regulatory land use scheme.
Based on the interpretation of RLUIPA in Sherman and St. John’s,
where zoning and eminent domain are used together to implement a
regulatory scheme, strict scrutiny should apply. In Sherman, the Supreme Court of Hawaii distinguished between the State’s eminent
domain power when used alone and when used in conjunction with a
184
zoning law.
Sherman presented a unique situation: the purpose of
the ROH was to facilitate the lease-to-fee conversion, not to rezone or
185
change the nature of the property use permitted.
However, eminent domain may be used in conjunction with zoning to effectuate a
186
broader regulatory scheme, as in Cottonwood. Based on the statutory
language of “or application of,” where eminent domain is used to
take religious property in order to implement a broader regulatory
scheme, including zoning regulations, strict scrutiny should apply.
Similarly, the St. John’s court acknowledged that eminent domain may
187
be used to take property that will subsequently be rezoned. Under
St. John’s, where this type of condemnation and subsequent rezoning
burdens free exercise, strict scrutiny under RLUIPA is appropriate.

181

Id.
St. John’s United Church of Christ, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 900 n.8.
183
See infra Part V.
184
City & County of Honolulu v. Sherman, 129 P.3d 542, 564 (Haw. 2006).
185
Id. at 545.
186
Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d
1203, 1222 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
187
St. John’s United Church of Christ, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 900.
182
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V. STRICT SCRUTINY REVIEW SHOULD APPLY WHERE THE EXERCISE OF
EMINENT DOMAIN OR IMPLEMENTATION OF ZONING ORDINANCES
BURDENS THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
A. The Individualized Assessment Exception to Smith
188

In Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court held that,
where a generally applicable law has the incidental effect of burdening free exercise of religion, the Court would apply rational basis re189
view. However, an exception to this general rule applies when the
state assesses, on an individual basis, whether the generally applicable
190
law should apply to a specific person or entity. In Smith, the Court
191
distinguished its holdings in Sherbert v. Verner and Bowen v. Roy. The
Court noted that in Sherbert, within the context of unemployment
compensation, there was individualized governmental assessment of
whether the employee conduct at issue merited the denial of unem192
ployment benefits. A strict scrutiny test was appropriate in this context because the state weighed the employee’s justification for termi193
nating his employment on an individual basis.
The distinction between generally applicable laws and those with
194
an individualized assessment mechanism is clarified in Bowen v. Roy.
In Bowen, appellee challenged a requirement in the Aid to Families
195
196
with Dependent Children Act and the Food Stamp Act that mandated that participants submit the social security numbers of the
197
members of their households in order to receive benefits. The appellee maintained that obtaining a Social Security number for his
minor daughter would violate their Native American religious beliefs
and claimed that the Free Exercise Clause entitled him to an exemp198
tion from the general requirement. In upholding the requirement,
the Court determined that it was neutral and uniform in application
and, therefore, did not need to be justified as “the least restrictive

188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198

494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Id. at 883.
Id. at 884.
Id.
Id.
Id.
476 U.S. 693 (1986).
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(25) (1994) (repealed 1996).
7 U.S.C. § 2025(e) (2000).
Bowen, 476 U.S. at 695.
Id.
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199

means of accomplishing a compelling state interest.”
Addressing
Sherbert, the Court stated that in that case a strict scrutiny standard
was appropriate because in determining if an employee should be
denied unemployment benefits, the government agency would have
to assess on an individual basis whether the employee had terminated
200
his employment “without good cause.”
Further, the court found
“[t]he ‘good cause’ standard created a mechanism for individualized
exemptions. If a state creates such a mechanism, its refusal to extend
an exemption to an instance of religious hardship suggests a discri201
minatory intent.”
Because the required submission of a Social Security number in Bowen applied to all applicants, there was no individualized assessment standard within the benefit programs, and
202
therefore, a strict scrutiny standard did not apply.
B. The Application of Zoning Ordinances as Individualized
Assessment
RLUIPA sought to apply the individualized assessment exception
of Smith to land use regulations that impermissibly burden the free
203
exercise of religion. Specifically, Congress found that religious organizations “are frequently discriminated against on the face of zoning codes and also in the highly individualized and discretionary
204
processes of land use regulation.”
As the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania stated in Freedom Baptist
205
Church v. Township of Middletown, zoning ordinances by their nature
require individualized assessments to determine on a case-by-case ba206
sis if the proposed activity is suitable to the land in question. In applying RLUIPA to zoning provisions, the Freedom Baptist court found
that Congress codified “the individualized assessments jurisprudence
207
in Free Exercise cases.” However, other courts have disagreed, finding instead that zoning regulations do not require individualized assessments.

199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207

Id. at 707–08.
Id. at 708.
Id.
Id. at 708–09.
146 CONG. REC. 16,699 (2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy).
See id.at 16,698.
204 F. Supp. 2d 857 (D. Pa. 2002).
Id. at 868.
Id.
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In Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the application of the city’s zoning code did not involve individualized assess209
ments.
The Grace United Methodist Church (“Grace United”)
sought to operate a child daycare center in the residential zone
210
where it owned property and applied for a variance. After holding
a public hearing, which included both witness testimony and evidence on how the proposed daycare center would operate, the city
211
denied the variance.
Grace United challenged the city’s denial of
the variance as a violation of both RLUIPA and the Free Exercise
212
Clause. The city argued that the zoning ordinance was a generally
213
applicable law, which should be subject only to rational basis review,
while Grace United argued that the zoning code’s system of case-bycase exceptions provided an opportunity for individualized exemp214
tions.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
agreed with the city, stating that “[w]hile it is true that the Board held
a hearing to evaluate the Church’s daycare request . . . ‘that kind of
limited yes-or-no inquiry is qualitatively different from the kind of
215
case-by-case system envisioned by the Smith Court.’” Thus, the court
held that the zoning code did not fall within the individualized as216
sessment exception of Smith.
Applying rational basis review, the
court found the denial of a variance did not offend either the Free
217
Exercise Clause or RLUIPA.
A brief examination of the application process for a variance or
conditional use permit illustrates that it is more than a limited inquiry and suggests that the approach of the Freedom Baptist court is
the more accurate one. In Vietnamese Buddhism Study Temple in Ameri218
ca v. City of Garden Grove, the temple applied for a CUP, which the

208

451 F.3d 643 (10th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 653.
210
Id. at 647.
211
Id. at 648.
212
Id. at 647.
213
Id. at 650.
214
Grace United, 451 F.3d at 650.
215
Id. at 654 (quoting Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1298 (10th Cir.
2004)).
216
Id. at 653; see also Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch,
510 F.3d 253, 276 (3d Cir. 2007) (showing that the court declined “to hold that every
zoning ordinance that includes a waiver or amendment provision is, solely by virtue
of that fact, unconstitutional unless it can survive strict scrutiny”).
217
Grace United, 451 F.3d at 655.
218
460 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
209
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219

city planning commission denied twice. Discussing the CUP application process, the United States District Court for the Central District of California found that, in fact, the temple was obligated to
meet several conditions in order to obtain a CUP, including meeting
requirements for minimum lot size, setback, parking, and access to
220
public roads. Further, once these conditions were met, the city was
required to make additional findings before the CUP could be is221
sued. Similarly, in Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc.
222
v. Broward County, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit listed six factors the Boca Raton Board of Adjustment
223
would consider when deciding whether to grant a variance. In fact,
RLUIPA’s congressional record suggests that Congress did not consider this type of application of a zoning code to be a generally appli224
cable law.
219
220
221

Id. at 1169–70.
Id. at 1168.
Id. Specifically, the proposed use:
(1) must be consistent with the city's adopted general plan; (2) must
not adversely affect the health, peace, comfort, or welfare of persons
residing or working in the surrounding area; (3) must not unreasonably interfere with the use, enjoyment, or valuation of surrounding
property; and (4) must not jeopardize or endanger the public health,
safety, or general welfare.

Id.
222

450 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1301. The criteria included:
(1) That there are unique and special circumstances or conditions applying to the property in question, or to the intended use of the property, that do not apply generally to other properties in the same district; (2) That any alleged hardship is not self-created by any person
having an interest in the property or is the result of mere disregard for,
or ignorance of, the provisions of the Code; (3) That strict application
of the provisions of the Code would deprive the petitioner of reasonable use of the property for which the variance is sought; (4) That the
variance proposed is the minimum variance which makes possible the
reasonable use of the property; (5) That the granting of the variance
will be in harmony with the general intent and purpose of the Code
and that such variance will not be injurious to the area involved or otherwise detrimental to the public welfare; (6) That there exists changed
or changing circumstances which make approval of the variance appropriate.
Id. at 1301 n.2.
224
146 CONG. REC. 19,123 (2000) (statement of Rep. Canady).
Section 2(a)(2)(C) applies the General Rule to cases in which the government has authority to make individualized assessments of the uses
to which the property is put. Unlike the Commerce and Spending
Clause sections, this section does not reach generally applicable laws.
Laws that provide for individualized assessments of proposed uses are
not generally applicable.
223
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C. Eminent Domain May Be Exercised in a Manner That Requires an
Individualized Assessment, and Therefore Should Be Subject to the
Same Strict Scrutiny as Zoning Regulations Where a Substantial
Burden Is Imposed on the Free Exercise of Religion
Assuming that zoning ordinances always or often implicate individual assessments, eminent domain may be applied in the same individualized manner. For example, a municipality may take a specific
property instead of multiple properties over a larger area. Where
eminent domain targets a specific property, its use should be subject
to strict scrutiny review if its application substantially burdens the free
exercise of religion.
225
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff illustrates how eminent domain can be directed at particular properties. In Midkiff, the Hawaii
Housing Authority (HHA) targeted specific properties which would
advance the legislature’s goal of breaking down concentrated land
226
ownership. The Hawaii Legislature passed the Land Reform Act of
1967 to address what the Supreme Court found was concentrated
227
land ownership that had the negative effect of inflating land prices.
The Act authorized the HHA to condemn residential tracts and trans228
fer ownership in fee simple to existing lessees. The fee simple owner would be compensated with the fair market value of the fee inter229
Prior to condemning appellees’ land, the “HHA made the
est.
statutorily required finding that acquisition of appellees’ land would
effectuate the public purposes of the Act . . . [and] directed appellees
230
to negotiate . . . the sale of the designated properties.” The appellees
challenged the Act as an unconstitutional exercise of the state’s po231
lice power. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found the purpose of the Act did not conform to the public use
232
requirement of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court found the
Act’s purpose of normalizing the residential land use market by era233
dicating land oligopoly was a valid exercise of a state’s police power.
Id.
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233

467 U.S. 229 (1984).
Id. at 232–34.
Id. at 232.
See id. at 233.
See id. at 234 n.2.
Id. (emphasis added).
Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 235.
Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788, 798 (9th Cir. 1983), rev’d, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242.
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The Court applied a deferential review to the Hawaii Legislature’s de234
termination that the Act was necessary to achieve this purpose.
235
Quoting Berman v. Parker, the Court found that “[o]nce the object is
within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the
236
exercise of eminent domain is clear.”
Furthermore, the Court
found that this level of judicial deference was no less appropriate
where a state legislature had made the conclusion that the Act served
237
a public purpose.
As Midkiff illustrates, eminent domain may be exercised in a
manner that requires the specific targeting of individual properties.
238
According to the Court’s holding in Employment Division v. Smith,
where such targeting occurs and imposes a substantial burden on free
239
exercise, strict scrutiny review is appropriate. Distinguishing Sherbert
240
v. Verner, the Smith Court determined that the denial of unemployment benefits in Sherbert required a determination by the Employment Division as to whether the employee’s reasons for terminating
241
his employment were justifiable. A strict scrutiny examination was
appropriate where this denial burdened the free exercise of religion
because the state agency would be weighing the justifications of the
242
particular individual. In other words, the agency would be assessing
whether a generally applicable law should apply to a specific individual. Similarly, in Midkiff the HHA conducted an individualized assessment of particular properties to determine if their acquisition
243
would further the purposes of the Land Reform Act of 1967. The
HHA therefore determined whether the generally applicable law, the
244
Land Reform Act of 1967, should apply to specific property. Moreover, if under RLUIPA Congress “codif[ied] the individualized assessments jurisprudence in Free Exercise cases” as the Freedom Baptist
245
court found, where eminent domain is exercised in an individua-

234

Id. at 242–43.
348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
236
Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240.
237
Id. at 244.
238
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
239
Id. at 884.
240
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
241
Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
242
Id.
243
Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 234 (1984).
244
Id.
245
Freedom Baptist Church v. Twp. of Middletown, 204 F. Supp. 2d 857, 868 (D.
Pa. 2002).
235
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lized manner, a strict scrutiny standard should be applied if the action burdens the free exercise of religion.
D. The Identification of Parcels for Takings Through Eminent Domain
and the Public Hearing Requirement in State Eminent Domain
Statutes Are Analogous to the Individualized Assessment That
Occurs in the Application of Zoning Regulations
As authorized by state constitutions, the state may take property
246
for public use upon payment of just compensation.
Further, this
247
authority may be delegated to counties and municipalities, public
248
transportation departments, and conservation and recreation de249
partments. The identification of property for taking through eminent domain is necessarily an individualized process, as the state or
250
municipality must designate which properties it intends to take.
Where a state statute requires a public hearing prior to an eminent domain condemnation, the municipality or state individually assesses the application of eminent domain to a particular property.
This hearing requirement is thus analogous to the individualized assessment that occurs in a zoning context, which under RLUIPA receives a strict scrutiny analysis if its application burdens the free exer-

246

See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. I, § 15 (“Right of Eminent Domain: Private property
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation as provided
by law.”).
247
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 166.411 (West 2000) (“Eminent domain; uses or
purposes” (authorizing municipalities to exercise the power of eminent domain for
public improvement; public parks; use of sewerage or drainage; laying wires; for city
buildings; and other municipal purposes)).
248
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 337.27 (West 2003) (“Exercise of power of eminent
domain by department; procedure; title; cost: The power of eminent domain is
vested in the department to condemn all necessary lands and property . . . for the
purpose of securing and utilizing transportation rights-of-way . . . .”).
249
See, e.g.,VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-201 (West 2006).
The Director [of the Department of Conservation and Recreation] is
authorized to acquire . . . by the exercise of the power of eminent domain, areas, properties, lands or any estate or interest therein, of scenic
beauty, recreational utility, historical interest, biological significance or
any other unusual features which in his judgment should be acquired,
preserved and maintained for the use, observation, education, health
and pleasure of the people of Virginia.
Id.
250
See, e.g., 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 67201 (West 2009) (“Acquisition of lands
and buildings: The board of supervisors may designate lands or buildings owned,
leased or controlled by the township for use as parks, playgrounds . . . and acquire
lands or buildings by lease, gift, devise, purchase or by the exercise of the right of
eminent domain for recreational purposes.” (emphasis added)).
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251

cise of religion. Because the application of eminent domain and a
zoning law are analogous when applied in this individualized manner, both methods of land use control should receive strict scrutiny
review when challenged under RLUIPA.
As part of formal eminent domain procedure, most states re252
quire some action by the condemnor prior to the condemnation.
For example, a state may require a resolution or finding by a condemnor stating that the condemnation is necessary, or the state may
253
require the condemnor to begin compensation negotiations.
Procedurally, the condemnor may take the property through an administrative procedure after which the condemnee is notified that the land
254
has been taken.
Or, the condemnor may take through a judicial
proceeding where the court, without a jury, determines whether the
right to take exists, followed by a compensation determination by an
255
appraiser. Alternatively, the court, again without a jury, determines
if there is a right to take, and the court or jury then determines the
256
amount of just compensation.
To illustrate, in Illinois an eminent domain suit is commenced
when the condemnor files a complaint in the county in which the
257
property is located. Questions about the right to condemn and any
disputes regarding compensation must be determined by a court
258
hearing before a jury.
The Cottonwood Christian Center v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency
court emphasized the individualized nature of eminent domain hear259
ings.
Cottonwood Christian Center had challenged the Cypress
Redevelopment Agency’s denial of their CUP and subsequent con260
demnation of church property.
The court found that the Redevelopment Agency condemned Cottonwood’s property as a necessary
261
step in the implementation of their broad redevelopment scheme.
Further, both the denial of the CUP and the exercise of eminent
251

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C) (2006).
7 PATRICK J. ROHAN & MELVIN A. RESKIN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 2A.03
(Rev. 3d ed. 2006).
253
Id.
254
Id.
255
Id.
256
Id.
257
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7-101 (West 2003).
258
Id.
259
Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d
1203, 1223 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
260
Id. at 1215.
261
Id. at 1223.
252
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domain power occurred in an individualized manner.
The court
emphasized that both actions were “quasi-judicial decisions wherein a
municipal agency is required to hold public hearings, take testimony
263
from the affected landowners, and make specific factual findings.”
Indeed, California eminent domain law requires that prior to authorizing a condemnation, the public entity must adopt a resolution of
264
necessity.
Such a resolution may only be adopted after each individual whose property will be affected has been given the opportunity
265
to be heard on the location, manner of implementation, and public
266
use aspects of the regulatory plan.
Hearings challenging the exercise of eminent domain require
an individualized assessment of the taking as applied to a specific
parcel of land. Therefore, under the individualized assessment exception to Smith, where the application of a resolution authorizing
the acquisition of property is applied in an individualized manner—
for example, where the municipality or state is required to assess the
resolution’s effect on a specific parcel—strict scrutiny should be applied.
In Smith, the Court approved the use of a strict scrutiny evaluation in Sherbert because there was individualized governmental assessment of whether the employee conduct at issue merited the deni267
al of unemployment benefits.
Similarly, where the condemnation
of religious property is challenged, the taking agency will be required
to determine whether the possible infringement on the free exercise
of religion merits an exception to the generally applicable resolution.
262
263
264
265

Id.
Id.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.220 (West 2007).
See id. § 1245.235.
Notice and hearing; contents; conduct
(a) The governing body of the public entity may adopt a resolution of
necessity only after the governing body has given each person whose
property is to be acquired by eminent domain . . . notice and a reasonable opportunity to appear and be heard on the matters referred to in
Section 1240.030.

Id.
266

See id. § 1240.030.
The power of eminent domain may be exercised to acquire property
for a proposed project only if all of the following are established:
(a) The public interest and necessity require the project.
(b) The project is planned or located in the manner that will be most
compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury.
(c) The property sought to be acquired is necessary for the project.

267

Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).

Id.
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Therefore, following current Supreme Court jurisprudence, where a
state or municipality considers the impact of a generally applicable
land use resolution on specific properties, strict scrutiny should be
applied if the state or municipality chooses to apply the resolution in
a manner that substantially burdens the free exercise of religion. In
fact, RLUIPA’s legislative history illustrates that with the Act, Congress specifically sought to codify Smith’s individualized assessment
268
exception.
The Act’s legislative history indicates that its sponsors
believed the Act to be necessary based on the “widespread pattern of
discrimination against churches as compared to secular places of as269
sembly . . . .” Thus, although the Supreme Court had held ten years
prior in Smith that strict scrutiny should apply in cases of individua270
lized assessment, RLUIPA’s sponsors clearly felt that the codification of this standard was necessary. Further, in order to guarantee
consistency of the application of strict scrutiny review to both exercises of eminent domain and the enforcement of zoning code provisions that substantially burden the free exercise of religion, RLUIPA’s
strict scrutiny mandate should apply to both tools of land use regulation.
VI. EMINENT DOMAIN CAN BE USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH A
CHANGE IN ZONING TO EFFECTUATE A REGULATORY SCHEME;
THEREFORE EMINENT DOMAIN SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE
SAME STRICT SCRUTINY REVIEW AS ZONING
Where eminent domain condemnations proceed or are used in
conjunction with changes in zoning codes as a method to effectuate a
broader land use regulatory scheme, it is incongruous to apply strict
scrutiny to challenges where zoning laws burden the free exercise of
religion but not where the exercise of eminent domain burdens the
free exercise of religion. Although eminent domain may not fall
within the definition of land use regulation as RLUIPA currently
271
stands, where both regulatory tools are used together for the pur268
269
270
271

Id.

146 CONG. REC. 16,699 (2000).
Id.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5) (2006).
The term “land use regulation” means a zoning or landmarking law, or
the application of such a law, that limits or restricts a claimant’s use or
development of land (including a structure affixed to land), if the
claimant has an ownership, leasehold, easement, servitude, or other
property interest in the regulated land or a contract or option to acquire such an interest.
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pose of implementing a regulatory scheme, strict scrutiny review is
appropriate if the condemnation substantially burdens the free exercise of religion.
A. Denver Urban Renewal Authority v. Pillar of Fire

272

In the pre-Smith case Denver Urban Renewal Authority v. Pillar of
Fire, the Supreme Court of Colorado applied strict scrutiny review to
the Denver Urban Renewal Authority’s condemnation of Pillar of
273
Fire’s church. In 1967 Denver began its downtown Urban Renewal
Project after determining the project area, which included the Pillar
274
of Fire church, was blighted. The Denver Urban Renewal Authority
(DURA) was authorized to condemn property within the area, and
“[u]pon acquisition, the property was to be rezoned and redeve275
loped.” The court found the city’s interests in the renewal project
outweighed Pillar of Fire’s interests in maintaining ownership of the
276
building. Notably, for the prior thirty years the building had been
used primarily as a commercial rooming house; it was used as a place
277
of worship only once a month. The court found that DURA had no
alternative means for accomplishing its goals and that the condemna278
tion was essential to the success of the renewal project. Pillar of Fire
illustrates how eminent domain and zoning are used together as tools
to effectuate a broader regulatory plan. As the court found, the condemnation was a necessary step in a renewal process that included
279
changes to the zoning code.
B. Eminent Domain Followed by Zoning Changes in the Valuation
Context
Under RLUIPA, if enforcement of a zoning law creates a sub280
stantial burden on free exercise, it is subject to strict scrutiny review.
Since eminent domain and zoning are frequently used together for
the broader purpose of land use regulation, where the use of eminent domain burdens free exercise, it should also be subject to strict
scrutiny review. Because changes to zoning codes frequently follow
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280

552 P.2d 23 (Colo. 1976).
Id. at 25.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 24–25.
Pillar of Fire, 552 P.2d at 25.
Id.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc(a)(2)(A)–(C), 2000cc-5(5) (2006).
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exercises of eminent domain authority, courts regularly confront the
issue of how to value property for compensation where a change in
the zoning code is imminent. When valuing property following a
condemnation proceeding, the court must consider the highest and
281
best use of the property.
Most states set the valuation date by sta282
tute.
The Court of Appeals of Arizona confronted the issue of valua283
tion in Town of Paradise Valley v. Young Financial Services, Inc. When
Paradise Valley was incorporated in 1961, all property was zoned as
284
residential.
Any zoning variance had to be approved by the Town
285
When the town
Council, which would grant a special use permit.
condemned appellee’s parcel, appellee Young Financial Services
sought to introduce evidence that it was reasonably probable that it
would be able to obtain a special use permit for the property, which
286
was adjacent to a municipal complex.
Addressing the town’s motion to suppress evidence on nonresidential development, the court stated that, generally, the market value of condemned property is determined by taking account of only
287
the permitted uses at the time of the condemnation. However, an
exception to this rule exists where there is “reasonable probability”
288
that a change in the zoning ordinance will occur in the near future.
289
The “project influence doctrine” is an exception to this exception.
As the court explained, the doctrine excludes evidence of an imminent change in zoning that is the result of the proposed project for
290
which the condemning authority is taking the property.
This pattern of condemnation immediately followed by a change in zoning
occurs with such frequency that a doctrine has emerged to guide the

281

7 PATRICK J. ROHAN & MELVIN A. RESKIN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 2A.03
(Rev. 3d ed. 2006).
282
Christopher A. Bauer, Government Takings and Constitutional Guarantees: When
Date of Valuation Statutes Deny Just Compensation, 2003 BYU L. REV. 265, 278 (2003)
(finding that twenty-one states and the District of Columbia have no valuation date
statute).
283
868 P.2d 971 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993).
284
Id. at 973.
285
Id.
286
Id.
287
Id. at 974.
288
Id.
289
Town of Paradise Valley, 868 P.2d at 974.
290
Id.; see also Williams v. City and County of Denver, 363 P.2d 171, 175 (Colo.
1961) (“[W]here the change in zoning results from the taking of the subject property . . . it is not admissible . . . .” ).
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courts in their quest to provide owners of the condemned property
with just compensation.
The Missouri Court of Appeals further articulated the doctrine
291
in Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Jenkins, where the court affirmed
the trial court’s decision to permit evidence regarding proposed zon292
Describing the project influence doctrine, the court
ing changes.
stated that “[t]he probability of rezoning (or even an actual change
in zoning) which results from the fact that the project which is the
basis for the taking was impending, cannot be taken into account in
293
valuing the property in the condemnation proceeding.”
The project influence doctrine makes clear that an eminent
domain condemnation is often followed by an immediate change in
zoning regulations. If such a zoning change were in itself to substantially burden the free exercise of religion, it would be subject to strict
294
scrutiny under RLUIPA. Therefore, where the two regulatory tools
of eminent domain and subsequent rezoning are used in conjunction
for the purpose of implementing a land use scheme, should the use
of eminent domain burden free exercise, it likewise should be subject
to strict scrutiny review.
VII. THE NEED FOR STRICT SCRUTINY AFTER KELO
295

In its landmark decision in Kelo v. City of New London, the Supreme Court held that taking property for economic purposes qualified as a public use within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment Tak296
ings Clause.
The city would not be permitted to take property
solely for the benefit of a private party; however, where the taking was
necessary to effectuate a comprehensive plan meant to provide economic benefits to the city, that exercise of eminent domain power
297
was valid. Fearing the impact of a holding equating public use with
economic benefit, the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, a public interest law firm focusing on religious land use and free exercise, sub298
mitted an amicus brief in support of the petitioners.
The fund
291

648 S.W.2d 555 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
Id. at 568.
293
Id. at 560 (citing 4 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.322 [1] at 12-655 (3d ed.
1981)) (court’s emphasis omitted).
294
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C) (2006).
295
545 U.S. 469 (2005).
296
Id. at 485.
297
Id. at 486–87.
298
Brief of Amicus Curiae the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty in Support of Petitioners, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108).
292
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feared that “[r]eligious institutions will always be targets for eminent
domain actions under a scheme that disfavors non-profit, tax-exempt
299
property owners . . . .”
In fact, Shelley Ross Saxer, a professor at
300
Pepperdine University School of Law, has echoed this fear.
Saxer
suggests that the application of strict scrutiny to eminent domain actions against religious property is necessary to offset the ease with
which cities may remove the substantial burden involved by paying
301
the owner just compensation.
Although the words “eminent domain” do not appear within the
302
congressional record for RLUIPA, it is conceivable that lawmakers
were not focused on the impact eminent domain could have on religious property; the RLUIPA hearings took place in 2000, a full five
years before the Supreme Court’s watershed decision in Kelo. In light
of Kelo’s new standard equating “public use” with “public purpose,”
there is even more reason to apply strict scrutiny to exercises of eminent domain which substantially burden the free exercise of religion.
303
Further, as Albanian Associated Fund v. Township of Wayne illustrates,
religious institutions are particularly vulnerable to the ad hoc decisions of municipal planning boards. The AAF was required to revise
its site plan three times and appeared before the planning board over
304
twenty times, which undoubtedly entailed tremendous expense.
RLUIPA’s supporters clearly intended that the Act function as a
means of avoiding this type of burden where it is not justified by a
305
compelling government interest.
VIII.CONCLUSION
Eminent domain is a fundamental power exercised by the state,
but its exercise must be balanced with the equally fundamental right
of free exercise. In its current form RLUIPA mandates strict scrutiny
review of zoning and landmarking laws; however, courts have debated
whether this standard should be extended to eminent domain challenges. Eminent domain may be considered a generally applicable
power, but it is frequently exercised in a manner that requires an in299

Id. at 3.
Shelley Ross Saxer, Eminent Domain Actions Targeting First Amendment Land Uses,
69 MO. L. REV. 653, 673 (2004).
301
Id. at 674.
302
146 CONG. REC. 16,698–705 (2000).
303
No. 06-cv-3217 (PGS), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73176 (D.N.J. Oct. 1, 2007).
304
Complaint, supra note 13, at 10.
305
See 146 CONG. REC. 16,698 (2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy).
300
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dividualized assessment of its potential impact. It is this individualized assessment that should bring eminent domain within the strict
scrutiny purview of RLUIPA. Further, because eminent domain and
zoning are frequently used together to enforce a land use regulatory
scheme, it would be incongruous to demand strict scrutiny review of
one regulatory tool and not the other. Eminent domain is an important and necessary power; however, free exercise is equally fundamental. Strict scrutiny review does not mean that the state is forbidden from condemning religious property; it simply means that
condemnation must be justified by a compelling state interest and
that the state action in question must be narrowly tailored to address
that interest. Because free exercise is a fundamental right protected
by the Constitution, it should be protected by strict scrutiny review.

